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THE EMERGENCY RESEARCH WAIVER OF
CONSENT RULE:
IS IT COMPATIBLE WITH CATHOLIC
TEACHING?
CHRISTOPHER

J. RoSKO* AND LEONARD J. NELSON, III**

With the advent of cardiac resuscitation and mechanical
ventilation in the 1970s, researchers sought to find better and more
effective treatments and techniques for stabilizing and treating
individuals who have injuries or illnesses that can rapidly lead to
irreversible physiologic decline and death. Innovations in emergency
medical treatment have focused attention on research without consent
in randomized clinical trials involving high-pressure and timesensitive situations.' When confronted with a rapidly progressing and
potentially life-threatening medical condition, taking the time to
explain a protocol or treatment and then obtain informed consent
would endanger the patient. Moreover, individuals in such
physiologic extremis do not have the capacity or the ability to
consent. If family members are available at the time of the
emergency, consent may be obtained from them, but this may also be
difficult because they too are likely suffering psychological distress.2
And frequently, treatment must be started immediately by Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) personnel because time is of the essence in
providing effective treatment.

* M.D., F.A.C.E.P., M.B.A., Certificate in Catholic Bioethics, NCBC; Associate Professor,
Department of Emergency Medicine, University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Medicine;
Senior Attending Physician, Emergency Department, V.A. Medical Center, Birmingham,
Alabama; Permanent Deacon, Catholic Diocese of Birmingham, Alabama.
** J.D., LL.M., Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; Senior Scholar, Lister
Hill Center, University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Public Health.
1. Terri A. Schmidt, MD et al., Confronting the Ethical Challenges to Informed Consent in
Emergency Medicine Research, II ACAD. EMERG. MED. 1082 (October 2004).
2. Richard P. Dutton et al., Impediments to Obtaining Informed Consent for Clinical
Research in Trauma Patients,64 J. OF TRAUMA 1106 (2008).
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While it may be appropriate to presume consent in emergency
medical treatment contexts in order to promptly provide beneficial
medical care to the patient, it is more difficult to justify research
without consent where the primary purpose is to benefit society rather
than the individual patient. Nonetheless, in 1996, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) adopted the Emergency Research Waiver of
Consent (ERWC) rule and simultaneously the Department of Health
and Human Services announced it was waiving informed consent for
research that complied with the FDA rule.' While some have
criticized the ERWC rule and particularly its reliance on community
consultation, others have argued that it provides adequate safeguards
and is justified by the potential benefit to society.'
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an
introduction to this issue for Institutional Review Board (IRB) 6
members at Catholic institutions, Catholic researchers, and IRB
members at non-Catholic institutions who happen to be Catholic.
There are undoubtedly ongoing trials already approved under the
ERWC rule involving Catholic hospitals, and there are likely to be
more in the future. We will begin with a brief review of a few multisite trials conducted under the ERWC rule. We will provide a brief
overview of the law governing informed consent in the medical
treatment context and then turn to the development of the
international and domestic legal regimes governing informed consent
in the research context. We will then turn to the ERWC rule
reviewing the main arguments against it, and discussing its
compatibility with Catholic teaching. Under some circumstances,
studies conducted under the ERWC rule could be inconsistent with
Catholic moral teaching, and IRBs at Catholic institutions should
carefully scrutinize protocols submitted under it.

3. 61 Fed. Reg. 51498 (Oct. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.24) (FDA regulation);
61 Fed. Reg. 51531 (Oct. 2, 1996) (The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) did
not adopt a regulation but announced that it was waiving informed consent for research meeting
the requirements set forth in the FDA regulation.).
4.

Douglas A. Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REv. 39, 74-

75 (2007).
5.

Michelle H. Biros, Research Without Consent: Current Status, 42 ANNALS EMER. MED.

550, 551 (2003).
6. As noted in § II.3.B., infra, Institutional Review Boards are required to review
emergency research protocols under both the common rule promulgated by DHHS and followed
by many other federal agencies and under the FDA rules.
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AN OVERVIEW OF SOME MULTI-SITE TRIALS

Although initially there were relatively few protocols
approved under the ERWC rule, in recent years there has been a
substantial increase in the number of trials and participants. 7
Nonetheless, some researchers believe the ERWC rule is still too
burdensome, and IRBs are hesitant to approve protocols due to fear
of liability.' The following provides a brief summary of some larger
trials.
One of the most notable protocols approved was the Public
Access Defibrillation (PAD) Trial, 9 a study involving the use of
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) alone or CPR plus use of an
Automated External Defibrillator'o (AED) by lay volunteers awaiting
arrival of the community's emergency medical services responders."
This multicenter, randomized trial involved 1,000 community sites
(e.g., shopping malls, apartments, senior centers, sports facilities) in
the United States and Canada. 2 The primary purpose of the trial was
to determine whether the use of properly trained AED responders in
urban settings could increase the numbers of cardiac arrest survivors
to hospital discharge, and Gillenwater reports that as of 2008 it was
the only completed trial reporting statistically significant positive
results."
7.

Gail E. Gillenwater, FDA's Emergency Research Rule: An Inch Given, A Yard Taken, 63

FOOD & DRUG L.J. 217, 218 (2008) (estimating 36,000 non-consenting enrollees in approved
ongoing trials with additional numbers expected in planned studies).
8. Biros, supra note 5, at 551.
9. Vincent N. Mossesso et al., Conducting Research Using the Emergency Exception from
Informed Consent: The PublicAccess Defibrillation (PAD) Trial Experience, 61 RESUSCITATION

29 (2004).
10. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute website notes:
An automated external defibrillator (AED) is a portable device that checks
the heart rhythm. If needed, it can send an electric shock to the heart to try
to restore a normal rhythm. AEDs are used to treat sudden cardiac arrest
(SCA)... if trained personnel aren't available, untrained people also can use
an AED to help save someone's life. You often find AEDs in places with
many people, such as shopping malls, golf courses, businesses, airports,
airplanes, casinos, convention centers, hotels, sports venues, and schools.
You also can purchase a home-use AED.
National Heart Lung, and Blood Institute, What Is an Automated External Defibrillator?,

http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/aed/ (last visited October 14, 2012).
11. The PAD Trial Investigators, The Public Access Defibrillation (PAD) Trial Study Design
and Rationale, 56 RESUSCITATION 135 (2003).

12.
13.

Id.
Gillenwater, supra note 7, at 235.
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Patients have also been the subjects of emergency medical
treatment research in several multi-site trials sponsored by the
Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium (ROC).14 The ROC trials are a
series of studies of emergency treatments for severe traumatic injury
and cardiac arrest.' 5 There are 11 ROC sites (eight in the United
States and three in Canada). 6 The first ROC study involved 6,000
patients/subjects that had sustained head trauma. One arm of this
study received saline infusions to stabilize blood pressure (standard
care) while the other arms received a hypertonic infusion containing
much higher levels of sodium either with or without a drug named
Dextran." This study was stopped after it was determined that the
hypertonic saline solutions worked no better than the standard care.'"
The second ROC study involved 15,000 victims of sudden
cardiac arrest.19 Patients in one arm of this study received a shock to
the heart before CPR was administered, while the other arms first
received a few minutes of CPR either with or without a special valve
device to push air into the lungs during the CPR.20 The enrollment in
this trial was stopped when the preliminary data indicated that neither
strategy significantly improved survival.2' There are also a number of
current ROC studies including a multi-site study involving 23,600
out-of-hospital cardiac arrest patients treated by EMS personnel
comparing survival rates of those in one arm being administered
standard CPR (the American Heart Association recommended
standard care) with those in the other arm being administered
Continuous Chest Compression. 22
The controversial PolyHeme study was another large, multisite trial. It involved the use of a hemoglobin-based oxygen carrier

14.

See Dutton, supra note 2, at 1106.

15. Rob Stein, CriticalCare Without Consent: Ethicists Disagree on Experimenting During
Crises, WASH. POST, May 27, 2007, at A01.
16. Daniel P. Davis et al., A Descriptive Analysis of Emergency Medical Service Systems
Participating in the Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium (ROC) Network, 11 PREHOSPITAL
EMERGENCY CARE 369 (2007).

17. Stein, supra note 15.
18. ROC Completed Studies, Hypertonic Saline in Traumatic Brain
https://roc.uwctc.org/tiki/completed-studies (last visited October 14, 2012).

Injury,

19. Stein, supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. ROC Completed Studies, Prehospital Resuscitation Using an IMedance Valve and
Early vs Delayed Analysis (PRIMED), https://roc.uwctc.org/tiki/completed-studies (last visited
Mar. 2, 2012).
22. ROC Current Studies, https://roc.uwctc.org/tiki/current-studies (last visited October 14,
2012).
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manufactured by Northfield Laboratories.2 3 The protocol for the
PolyHeme study was approved by the FDA under the ERWC rule
and under a Special Protocol Assessment (SPA) that sets up a fast
track for the approval of protocols where the experimental treatment
has no existing alternatives.24 Phase II trials showed improved
survival from the use of PolyHeme in cases involving extreme
endogenous hemoglobin deprivation. Accordingly, the FDA
approved a phase III trial involving 720 hemorrhagic shock victims
that was to be conducted at 32 trauma centers in the United States
from 2006-2007.25
The PolyHeme trial included both a pre-hospital phase and an
in-hospital phase and enrollment occurred in the field before arrival
at the emergency room.26 While it was unlikely that consent could be
obtained in the field, upon arrival at the hospital efforts were to be
made to obtain consent from the patient or a legally authorized
representative (LAR).27 But absent formal withdrawal, participation
was to be continued by default. 28 In the pre-hospital phase, patients
were randomized between a control group that was given saline, the
current standard of care, and the group that was given PolyHeme.2 9
During the in-hospital phase, those patients that had received saline
were given whole blood (the standard care), but patients in the
PolyHeme arm continued to receive it rather than whole blood for up
to 12 hours after arrival at the hospital.3 0
The controversial part of the trial was the continued use of
PolyHeme after hospital admission. Kipnis et al. (2006) argues that
while there was justification for a randomized clinical trial comparing
whole blood with PolyHeme in the pre-hospital phase, the use of
transfused whole blood in the hospital setting was a "proven and
satisfactory treatment," and accordingly use of PolyHeme during the
in-hospital phase required the informed consent of the patient or an

23.

Sameer S. Apte, Blood Substitutes-The PolyHeme Trials, 11 McGILL J. OF MED. 59

(2008).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Ken Kipnis et al., An Open Letter to InstitutionalReview Boards Considering Northfield
Laboratories'PolyHemeTrial, 6 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 18 (2006).
27. Id. at 19. See also 45 C.F.R § 46.102(c) ("Legally authorized representativemeans an
individual or judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to consent on behalf of a
prospective subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research.").
28. Kipnis, supra note 26, at 18.
29. Apte, supra note 23, at 60.
30. Apte, supra note 23, at 60
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LAR.1' On the other hand, Dougherty (2006) argues that the protocol
was appropriate under the ERWC rule because transfusion with
banked blood is not a satisfactory treatment due to its link with
increased incidence of multi-organ failure.3 2 And Silbergeit et al.
(2006) argues that whole blood is an "unsatisfactory" treatment
noting that it is in short supply, has adverse side effects, 35 percent of
patients that receive it still die, and those who refuse it may still
survive.33
Northfield was also criticized for not disclosing the study
protocol at the community meetings. 34 The PolyHeme study did not
achieve statistically significant results although the death rate was
slightly higher in the group receiving PolyHeme, and it was shut
down by Northfield after Senator Charles Grassley (R-lowa) sent
letters to the FDA and DHHS expressing concern that the trials were
unethical."
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE TREATMENT CONTEXT

Beginning in the 1950s with Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Hospital, courts in the United States began to recognize a cause of
action for lack of informed consent in the treatment context based on
negligence.36 "It was Salgo that finally shifted patient consent in
clinical settings from being beneficence-based (doing surgery without
patient consent 'hurts' the patient) to autonomy based (a patient has a
right to self-determination through informed, comprehensive
consent)."" Under the doctrine of informed consent, physicians are

31.

See Kipnis, supra note 26.

32. Anne Hamilton Dougherty, Letter to the Editor:In Defense of the PolyHeme Trial,6 AM.
J. OF BIOETHICS 35 (2006).

33.

Robert Silbergleit et al., What Treatments are "Satisfactory?" Divining Regulatory Intent

and an Ethical Basis for Exception to Informed Consent for Emergency Research, 6 AM. J. OF
BIOETHICS 24 (2006).

34. Kipnis, supra note 26, at 19.
35. Gillenwater, supra note 7, at 237; see also Thomas M. Burton, Amid Alarm Bells, A
Blood Substitute Keeps Pumping, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2006 (stating that an additional troubling
aspect of the PolyHeme trial was the failure of Northfield to publicly disclose an earlier trial that
was shut down after ten of 81 patients had suffered heart attacks and two of those died within
seven days of receiving PolyHeme while none of the patients in the trial that had received whole
blood suffered a heart attack).
36. Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
37.

Paul R. Wolpe, The Triumph of Autonomy in American Medical Ethics: A Sociological
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supposed to provide the patient with information on the nature of the
treatment, its risks, and appropriate alternatives."
Although the origins of the informed consent doctrine are in
battery, most jurisdictions have now adopted negligence as a more
appropriate basis for causes of action for lack of informed consent.39
When this shift to negligence occurred, courts began to treat
informed consent actions as conventional medical malpractice
cases.4 0 Accordingly, like other malpractice cases the focus was on
the professional standard, i.e., whether the defendant physician in
failing to provide information to the patient had acted in accordance
with accepted practices in the medical profession. Under this
standard, the plaintiff seeking to recover for lack of informed consent
is required to provide expert medical testimony as to whether the
physician violated professional custom in failing to provide adequate
information to the patient.4 '
Subsequently, however, several courts rejected the
professional standard and instead embraced a prudent patient
standard under which physicians are required to provide patients with
information that a reasonable, prudent patient in similar
circumstances would deem material to a decision to consent to
treatment.42 Under either standard, however, patient autonomy is only
partially protected because most courts follow an objective standard
of causation that requires the patient to prove that a reasonable,
prudent patient when informed of the risk would have refused the
treatment. 43 Further, only patients that have suffered an adverse
outcome from the undisclosed risk have a cause of action against
their physician.44
The requirement of informed consent in the treatment context
has now been recognized by the American Medical Association as a
basic principle of medical ethics. 4 5 Notwithstanding its widespread
View, in BIOETHICS AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ENTERPRISE OF
BIOETHICS 38, 51(1998).
38. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 190 (5th ed. 1984).
Maguire Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
L.J. 219, 224-26 (1985).
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
J. Nelson, III, Consent to Treatment in DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.05[2] (2011).
42. Id at § 22.05[3]; see also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J.
899,916(1994).
43. Schultz, supra note 39, at 227.
44. Schuck, supra note 42, at 925-26.
45. American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics, §§ 2.07 and 8.08 (Chicago, IL,
39. Marjorie
Interest, 95 YALE
40. See, e.g.,
41. Leonard
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acceptance, some contend that informed consent has had only limited
success in meeting the needs of patients because physicians have
resisted sharing decision-making authority with patients.4 6 Others are
skeptical of the value of informed consent,47 and some studies suggest
that most patients do not understand and do not retain the information
provided to them.48
It is generally recognized that the informed consent of the
patient is not always required in the treatment context. For example,
if a patient becomes incapacitated, treatment decisions may be made
by a surrogate decision-maker, i.e., a third person who has the
authority to make medical decisions for an incapacitated patient. All
states have adopted laws permitting a legally competent individual to
execute a document authorizing a proxy to make healthcare decisions
on behalf of a patient after the patient loses decision-making
capacity. 49 When there is no proxy or a guardian with authority to
make medical decisions, many states have adopted statutes
designating the patient's spouse, then adult children, then parents or
siblings, to act as the patient's surrogate decision-maker.so And even
in the absence of such a statute, physicians typically presume that
close family members who know the patient have decision-making
authority.'
Moreover, in the case of medical emergencies where a delay
could cause serious harm to the patient, courts have recognized that if
the patient is unable to consent and a surrogate decision-maker is not
readily available, then informed consent to treatment is presumed.5 2
Generally, the scope of consent in these situations is limited so that
"the extent of the intervention should be proportionate to the

1997).
46. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Thomas P. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 21 (1987), cited in Schuck, supra note 42, at 904.
48. Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A
Review and Critiqueof the EmpiricalStudies, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 265 (1983).
49. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING § 7.01 [B][4] (3d ed, 2004).
50. Id.at§8.01.
51. Id.at§3.16[C][1].
52. Sandra J. Carnahan, Promoting Medical Research Without SacrificingPatientAutonomy:
Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consentfor Emergency Research, 52
OKLA. L. REV. 565, 574 (1999); Alexander M. Capron, Legal Setting of Emergency Medicine, in
KENNETH V. ISERSON ET AL., ETHICS INEMERGENCY MEDICINE 13, 20 (1986).
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emergency itself."" But, as discussed infra, it is more difficult to
justify research without consent than treatment without consent.
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE RESEARCH CONTEXT

The doctrine of informed consent emerged in the clinical
research context before it was recognized in the treatment context.5 4
The United States has taken a leading role in the development of
international and domestic normative frameworks emphasizing the
importance of informed consent of subjects in justifying their
participation in clinical research trials." Although it is viewed
primarily as a method of fostering human dignity and autonomy,
informed consent also serves as an additional safeguard against
unethical experiments. As noted infra, many poorly designed
experiments with endpoints of death or serious injury have been
conducted without obtaining informed consent. These experiments
could not be ethically justified even with informed consent, but the
failure to require informed consent certainly facilitated their conduct.
In the development of these norms, policymakers have
generally attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the
competing desires to protect human dignity and foster scientific
advances. But despite attempts at regulation there have been
numerous unfortunate and notorious instances of researchers, some
conducting clinical trials with support of agencies of the United
States government, failing to protect the rights of research subjects.
Frequently, these unethical trials were motivated by national security
concerns.
1.

The InternationalLegal Framework

The two most significant documents in the international
context are the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration.
Ironically, prior to World War II,Germany was a leader in regulating
human subject research. The necessity of obtaining informed consent
in research trials had emerged as an issue in Germany in the 19th
century. 6 Thus "at the turn of the century informed consent was
53. Capron, supranote 52, at 20.
54. Wolpe, supra note 37, at 51
55.

See Andrew C. Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, in ETHICS IN MEDICINE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS

267-73 (1977).

56. Jochen Vollmann & Rolf Winau, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation Before
the Nuremberg Code, 3134 BRITISH MED. J. 1445 (1996).
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already a legal doctrine in medical experimentation in Germany,
being based on 'unambiguous consent' of the subject after 'proper'
information had been given by the doctor, including negative
consequences and side effects."" In 1931, Germany enacted binding
regulations governing human subject research that were in some
ways stricter than the later Nuremberg Code." Although they were
ignored by the Nazis, these regulations remained in effect until
1945.19 These regulations required informed consent to experimental
treatments except in cases where it is "urgently required, and cannot
be postponed because of a need to save life or prevent severe damage
to health, and if prior consent could not be obtained owing to special
circumstances."60
Notwithstanding these antecedents, accounts of the history of
the regulation of human subject research typically begin with the trial
of Nazi doctors by the victorious allies and the promulgation of the
Nuremberg Code.' Walter Beals, an army reserve officer on leave
from his position as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Washington, presided over this trial.62 Twenty-three physicians were
tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity for their
involvement in unethical and frequently fatal medical experiments:
sixteen were convicted and seven were hanged.63 In rendering its
verdict the court adopted the Nuremberg Code (1947), which laid
down ten standards for ethical conduct in conducting medical
research on human beings. The first principle of the Nuremberg Code
states: "The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.""
As Garnett (1996) has noted, the Nuremberg informed
consent standard has been criticized as being too demanding and not
57.

Id.

58.

Hans-Martin Sass, Reichsrundschreben 1931: Pre-Nuremberg German Regulations

Concerning New Therapy and Human Experimentation, 8 J. MED. & PHIL. 99 (1983).
59. Id. at 104.
60. Id. at 105.

61.

See, e.g., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protectionsfor Research

Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (July

26, 2011).
62. Mary Whisner, Nuremberg Trials: Washington Connections (Feb. 7, 2009),
http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/nuremberg.html; Chief Justice Gerry Alexander, The Nuremberg
Trials: A Washington Connection, 63 WASH. STATE BAR NEWS 18 (Jan. 2009), available at

http://www.wsba.org/News-and-Events/Publications-Newsletters-Brochures/Bar
News/-/media/Files/News Events/Publications/Bar/o2ONews/
2009%2OFull%20lssues/20090JanuaryBarNews.ash (last visited October 14, 2012).
63. Alexander, supra note 62, at 20.
64. The Nuremberg Code (1947), 313 BRITISH MED. J. 1448 (1996).
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sufficiently deferential to the necessity of human experimentation in
medical progress.65 Others have noted that it has never been fully
embraced by the international community.66 Nonetheless, although
the United States has "never ratified or adopted the Nuremberg
Code,"6 the Second Circuit has recognized its prohibition on
nonconsensual medical experimentation as a universally accepted
norm of customary international law. 8
The Helsinki Declaration of the World Medical Association,
first issued in 1964 and subsequently revised on several occasions, is
less absolute in its requirements than the Nuremberg Code. It requires
that "subjects must be volunteers and informed participants in the
research project." 69 But it does accept the notion of surrogate
consent.10 The current version also provides for research without
consent under some circumstances." The Helsinki Declaration has
had a greater influence on domestic laws than the Nuremberg Code
and has been recognized as binding customary law.7 2 Nonetheless, in
2008, acceding to the request of pharmaceutical manufacturers, the
FDA removed its requirement that foreign clinical trials conducted
without an investigational new drug (IND) application" had to

65. Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of
Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 472 n.75 (1996) (citing Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the
Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG
CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 227, 238 (1995)).
66. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 1870811 * 11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005), rev'd, 562
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S.Ct. 3541 (2010) (citing George J. Annas & Michael A.
Grodin, Medical Ethics and Human Rights: Legacies of Nuremberg, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
SYMP. 111, 113-14 (1999)). See also Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the
Nuremberg Code, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1439 (1997); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper
Corporation, 414 F.3d 233, 257 (2nd Cir. 2003).
67. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 176 (noting that "[a] formal treaty ... is not the lone primary
source of customary international law.").
68. Id. at 183-84.
69. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKa, 1 20, available at
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ (last visited October 14, 2012).
70. Id. at 1l5.
71. Id.at l17.
72. Abullahi, 562 F.3d at 181-82.
73. The FDA website notes:
Current Federal law requires that a drug be the subject of an approved
marketing application before it is transported or distributed across state
lines. Because a sponsor will probably want to ship the investigational drug
to clinical investigators in many states, it must seek an exemption from that
legal requirement. The IND is the means through which the sponsor
technically obtains this exemption from the FDA.
FDA, InvestigationalNew DrugApplication, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval
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comply with the Helsinki Declaration and instead substituted a
requirement that the trials be conducted in accordance with good
clinical practices and reviewed by an independent ethics committee.74
2.

The Persistenceof the "DachauModel"

Researchers have tended to view the Nuremberg Code's
informed consent requirement as too demanding, and compliance
with it has frequently been subordinated to the demands of national
security by United States government agencies because of the value
of information to be gleaned from the "Dachau Model" of human
subject research." After World War II, the United States government
sought to reap the benefits of unethical experiments conducted by
both the Japanese and German military doctors. In order to obtain
information on biological warfare research and keep it out of the
hands of the Soviet Union, the United States government refused to
prosecute members of the Japanese Army's notorious Unit 731 who
had conducted atrocious medical experiments during World War I. 76
Subsequently, in the 1950s the United States Air Force recruited Nazi
doctors who had been involved in unethical altitude sickness and
hypothermia experiments involving Dachau prisoners to start its
aviation medicine school in Texas and published an account of their
research.
During the Cold War, agencies of the United States
government supported and conducted numerous radiation
experiments for purposes related to national security.78 Hospitalized
patients were injected with plutonium without their consent for the
purpose of obtaining knowledge to better protect workers involved in
the production of material for nuclear weapons." At the University of
Cincinnati, terminally ill cancer patients were subjected to total body
irradiation without their knowledge in experiments supported by the
(Continued from previous page)
process/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved//approvalapplications/
investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm (last visited October 14, 2012).
74. 73 Fed. Reg 22800 (Apr. 28, 2008) (codified at 21 CFR § 312 (2008)).
75. Alfred W. McCoy, Science in Dachau'sShadow: Hebb, Beecher, and the Development of
CIA Psychological Torture and Modern Medical Ethics, 43 J. HIST. BEHAv. SCI., 401, 403 (2007)

(citing

JOHN MARKS, THE SEARCH FOR THE "MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE": THE CIA AND MIND
CONTROL 9, 9-11 (1979)).
76. HAL GOLD, UNIT 731 TESTIMONY, 101-15 (1996).

77.

McCoy, supra note 75, at 403.

78. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(October 1985).
79. Id. at 264-69.
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military to "find a biological dosimeter and provide additional human
performance data of military interest.""o There were numerous
intentional releases of radiation into the environment without notice
to affected populations." These releases included the infamous Green
Run where radioiodine was intentionally released from the Hanford
nuclear facility in Washington State to "develop intelligence
techniques to understand the threat posed by the Soviet Union"8 2
Prevailing winds carried radioiodine over eastern Washington and
levels were monitored to determine levels of radioactive material in
the air, water, and vegetation. 8 Information on the Green Run
remained classified until 1986.84 With respect to these experiments,
Dr. Katz noted:
My reading of the Cold War record suggests that
governmental officials in concert with their medical
advisers at best paid lip service to consent. Whenever
they considered it, they worried mostly about legal
liability and embarrassment. They were not worried or
embarrassed about their willingness to conscript
unconsenting patient-subjects to serve as means in
plutonium and whole body radiation experiments. All
this is a frightening example of how thoughtlessly
human beings, including physicians, can treat human
beings for 'noble' purposes. Most references to
consent (with rare exceptions) that we uncovered in
governmental documents or in exchanges between
officials and their medical consultants were
meaningless words, which conveyed no appreciation
of the nature and quality of disclosure that must be
provided if patient-subjects were truly to be given a
choice to accept or decline participation in research.
Form, not substance, punctuated most of the policies on
consent during the Cold War period. The drafters of the federal
regulations would eventually build their rules on this shaky historical
foundation, disregarding in the process that the imprecision of their
80. Id at 386-87.
81.

Id. at 506.

82.

Id at 509

83.

Id. at 510.

84.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 78, at 510.
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policies invited physician-investigators not to alter decisively
customary Hippocratic practices. "There is also evidence of pervasive
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for unethical
psychological research during the Cold War that involved prominent
researchers.8 6 In 1966, a landmark article by Harvard Professor Henry
Beecher exposed research abuses in trials conducted in the United
States and particularly drew attention to the failure to obtain informed
consent in several studies." Observing that informed consent had
been mentioned in only two of the fifty published studies he
reviewed, Beecher argued that it should be obtained in all studies for
legal and moral reasons." He was, however, skeptical of its efficacy
opining that "[c]onsent in any fully informed sense may not be
obtainable[,]" and further that "it would be unrealistic to place much
dependence on it.""' But it now appears that Beecher may have been
involved in CIA-sponsored research conducted in Germany during
the Cold War that involved the use of psychotropic drugs "on
unwitting human subjects." 0 This research may have been inspired
by the use of mescaline to interrogate inmates at Dachau." Ironically,
Beecher thought the presence of a "responsible investigator" to "be a
far more dependable safeguard" than informed consent.92
In 2010, while conducting research on the Tuskegee Study,
Susan Reverby, a medical historian from Wellesley happened on
evidence that the United States Public Health Service conducted
research in Guatemala in the 1940s that involved deliberately
infecting Guatemalans with venereal diseases.93 Subsequently, in
2011, during hearings on the Guatemalan research before the
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (the
85. Id. at 850.
86. See McCoy, supra note 75; but see Thomas Blass, UnsupportedAllegations About a Link
Between Milgram and the CIA: TorturedReasoning in A Question of Torture, 43 J. OF THE HIST.

BEHAV. SCI. 199 (2007) (disputing McCoy's allegation that Milgram's obedience research was
funded by the CIA); Richard E. Brown, Alfred McCoy, Hebb, the CIA and Torture, 43 J. OF THE
HIST. BEHAV. SC. 205 (2007) (disputing the allegation that Donald 0. Hebb, Chair of Psychology
at McGill University, was involved in special interrogation research).
87.
88.
89.

Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1354 (1966).
Id. at 1355.
Id.

90. McCoy, supra note 75, at 410-14.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Stephen Smith, Wellesley Professor Unearths a Horror: Syphilis Experiments in
at
available
2,
2010,
Oct.
GLOBE,
BOSTON
Guatemala,

http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2010/10/02/wellesleyprofessor-unearths
-ahorror syphilis-experiments-in guatemala/.
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"Presidential Commission"), it was revealed that from 1946-1948,
the United States Public Health Service supported experiments where
Guatemalan prostitutes infected with syphilis were paid to have sex
with prisoners.94 And in some cases, if this was not sufficient to infect
the men, "bacteria were poured into scrapes made on the penises or
faces, or even injected by spinal puncture.""
Approximately 5,500 Guatemalans were involved in these
experiments and approximately 1,300 "were deliberately infected
with syphilis, gonorrhea or chancroid." 6 The purpose of the study
was to determine whether the administration of penicillin after
exposure could prevent infection.9 7 One of the researchers involved in
this study was John C. Cutler, a former Assistant United States
Surgeon General who had served as the Acting Dean at the School of
Public Health of the University of Pittsburgh in 1968-1969, and was
also involved in the Tuskegee Study, discussed infra. 9
The Presidential Commission's report on the Guatemalan
experiments noted that one of the motivating factors in conducting
this research was to enhance military efficiency by reducing the
prevalence of STDs among members of the armed forces. 99 The
Presidential Commission found an intentional disregard by the
researchers of "generally accepted moral principles." 00 It noted that
the research originated in the same government laboratory and
involved some of the same researchers as the Tuskegee study.o'0 The
experiment was carried on despite the knowledge of the researchers
that it violated "existing basic ethical standards" in order "to serve
scientific and government ends."l02 The Presidential Commission
found "there is no evidence that consent was sought or obtained from
the individual subjects who were the subjects of the research. On the
94. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Panel Hears Grim Details of Venereal Disease Tests, N.Y.
available
at
30,
2011,
TIMES,
Aug.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/world/americas/3 Isyphilis.htmlpagewanted=all.

95.

Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Torsten Ove, Late Pitt Dean Cutler Denouncedfor Infecting Guatemalans with Syphilis
in Research Experiment, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2011, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/l 1242/1170833-53-0.stm.
99. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, "ETHICALLY
15, available at
IN GUATEMALA FROM 1946-1948
IMPOSSIBLE" STD RESEARCH

http://www.bioethics.gov/cms/sites/default/files/Ethically-Impossible-PCSBI.pdf
October 14, 2012).
100. Id. at 8.
101.
102.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.

(last

visited
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contrary, there were examples of active deceit."103 The Presidential
Commission concluded that the research was "morally wrong" and
the researchers involved were "morally blameworthy."'M It also
concluded that researchers had violated the Nuremberg Code. 05 The
report opined: "The events in Guatemala serve as a cautionary tale of
how the quest for scientific knowledge without regard to relevant
ethical standards can blind researchers to the humanity of the people
they enlist into research."o 6 Certainly, the persistence of the Dachau
Model despite the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code suggests a
need for continuing vigilance and focus on the necessity of informed
consent to protect research subjects.
3.

United States Domestic Law

In the 1960s, there were efforts in the United States to
strengthen the domestic legal oversight of human subject research.
These legal reforms were typically undertaken in response to expos6s
of research misconduct. For example, in 1962, in response to the
Thalidomide scare, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 strengthened oversight of drug
trials by requiring that manufacturers establish both the safety and
efficacy of drugs. This legislation was occasioned by the attempts of
the drug's manufacturer to pressure employees of the Food and Drug
Administration to approve Thalidomide despite inadequate
supporting scientific studies to establish its safety. 07 As part of this
legislation, there was a requirement of informed consent in drug
trials.'" But this legislation was "largely ineffective" due to "broad
exceptions where obtaining consent was 'not feasible' or not in the
best interests of the subjects." 109 Subsequently, in 1966, the Surgeon
General issued a directive requiring research supported solely by the
government to be peer reviewed in order to ensure protection of the

Id. at 92.
Id. at 8.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 99, at 94-96.
Id. at 7.
107. L. Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA Medical Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History,
2001),
(March-April
MAGAZINE
FDA
CONSUMER
35
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1609/www.fda.gov/fdac/features/
103.
104.
105.
106.

2001/201 kelsey.html, cited in Coleman, infra note 138, at 36.
108. Id.
109. Jesse Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the
Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 63, 94 (1993).
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rights of research subjects and the use of appropriate methods of
obtaining informed consent."o
In the 1970s, significant steps were undertaken in the United
States to strengthen protection for research subjects in response to
public revelation of the Tuskegee syphilis study in 1972. This study
was begun under the auspices of the United States Public Health
Service in 1932 in rural Macon County, Alabama. The study involved
399 African American males infected with syphilis, and a control
group of 201 men from the same community that were not infected.
When penicillin became available, the men with syphilis were not
provided this treatment.'
In reaction to the expos6 of the Tuskegee syphilis study, the
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs at the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), appointed an
ad hoc panel to investigate the study. A report issued by the
committee concluded that there was no evidence that informed
consent had been obtained from the human participants in the
study.112 It also found that treatment had been withheld from
participants."'
Jay Katz, an adjunct member of the committee, believed that
the majority report was too timid in its condemnation of the study.
Accordingly, he wrote his own opinion noting that, based on the
testimony at Nuremberg, the Tuskegee study "would have been
intolerable .

.

. anywhere in the civilized world." Nonetheless, Katz

noted that it continued after the Nazi Doctors trial and the
promulgation of the Nuremberg Code and was not reviewed even
after the 1966 Surgeon General's directive was issued." 4 He further
observed, "The most fundamental reason for condemning the
Tuskegee Study at its inception and throughout its continuation is not
that all the subjects should have been treated, for some might not
have wished to be treated, but rather that they were never fairly
consulted about the research project, its consequences for them, and
I10. Id.at95.
111. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD Hoc ADVISORY PANEL (1973), available at
[hereinafter "TUSKEGEE
http://biotech.1aw.Isu.edu/cphl/history/reports/tuskegee/tuskegee.htm
SYPHILIS STUDY"].
112. Id. at 8.

113.

Id. at 9.

114. Id. at 14; see also Jay Katz, M.D., Reservations About the Panel Report on Charge 1,
availableat http://biotech.1aw.lsu.edu/cphl/history/reports/tuskegee/katzl.pdf (last visited October
14, 2012).
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the alternatives available to them.""' Not surprisingly, revelations of
the Tuskegee Study reinforced a legacy of mistrust of clinical
research in the African-American community." 6
In 1974, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(DHEW) issued new regulations governing Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs)." 7 These regulations moved away from the concept of
peer review and instead embraced the concept of local [RBs that
would include non-scientific members. I" Peckman notes:
The new regulations emphasized the importance of
considering research in the context of community
standards. The regulations defined the composition of
an IRB as having a minimum of five members and that
it should "include persons whose primary concerns lie
in the areas of legal, professional, and community
acceptability rather than in the conduct of research,
development, and services programs supported by the
HEW." In order to ensure a diversity of opinion when
considering protocols, membership on an IRB could
not come from a single professional or lay group.
Furthermore, the regulations now protected against an
implicit institutional bias and conflict of interest by
mandating that a legally convened meeting must
include at least one member not otherwise affiliated
with the institution.'

'9

The revelation of research abuses in the Tuskegee syphilis
study and other studies also led to the passage of the National
Research Act of 1974.120 This legislation created the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (the Commission). 2 ' In 1979, the Commission
published the Belmont Report (the Report) which articulated three
basic ethical principles governing research on human subjects:
115.

TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 111.

116. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETIA LACKS 50, 186 (Crown 2010).
117. Steven Peckman, Local Institutional Review Boards in National Bioethics Advisory
Council, in 1l ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES INRESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, K1, K-7 (2001), availableat http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/human/overvol2.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.atK-7.
120. Goldner, supra note 109, at 96.
121. Id.
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respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.'22 The Report became a
foundational document for the new secular bioethics movement
despite its philosophical incoherence. One observer noted, "[The
Report] quite selectively took bits and pieces from different and
contradictory ethical theories and rolled them up into one ball."' 23 The
principles could contradict each other when applied, and there was no
hierarchy among them.' 24 Moreover, there are internal contradictions
within the Report:
For example, while the Commissioners of The
Belmont Report gave a nod to the traditional
Hippocratic understanding of "beneficence" in one
definition as "doing good for the patient" (or at least,
doing no "harm"), their second definition of
"beneficence" is essentially utilitarian-in terms of the
good for society at large (or roughly, "the greatest
good for the greatest number of people."' 25
The Report distinguishes between medical practice and
research: "'practice' refers to interventions that are designed solely to
enhance the well-being of an individual patient. . .and that have a
reasonable expectation of success."l2 6 On the other hand, "'research'
designates activity designed to test a hypothesis, permit conclusions
to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge."' 27 With respect to informed consent, the Report
delineated three essential components: information, comprehension,
and voluntariness.128 As to information, it opined that both of the
malpractice standards (i.e., professional standard and prudent patient
standard) are "insufficient" in the research context because "the
research subject, being in essence a volunteer, may wish to know
122. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (hereinafter

HEALTH, EDUCATION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
AND GUIDELINES FOR
"BELMONT REPORT")

AND WELFARE, THE
OF BIOMEDICAL AND
THE PROTECTION OF

(1979), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html#xethical.
123. Dianne N. Irving, What is "Bioethics" (Quid Est. "Bioethics"), LIFE AND LEARNING X,
UNIVERSITY

FACULTY

FOR

LIFE

PROCEEDINGS

21

(2000),

available

at

http://uffl.org/voll0/irvingi0.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 122, at Part A: Boundaries Between Practice & Research.
127. Id.
128. Id. at Part C.1.
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considerably more about risks gratuitously undertaken than do
patients who deliver themselves into the hands of a clinician for
needed care."l 2 9 In the case of prospective subjects with limited
comprehension, the report acknowledged a role for surrogate
decision-makers, but further indicated that those "chosen should be
those who are most likely to understand the incompetent subject's
situation and to act in that person's best interest." 0
In 1981, the Report led to the adoption of revised regulations
governing human subject research in the United States by DHHS'3"
and the FDA. 3 2 In 1991, several federal agencies adopted a uniform
set of regulations identical to subpart "A" of the DHHS regulation,
and it is now known as the Common Rule."' Thus there are now two
sets of regulations and that have significant roles in regulating human
subject research: the Common Rule 3 4 and the FDA regulations."'
Some studies come under both sets of regulations.13 6
The Common Rule is administered by the Office of Human
Research Protections (OHRP), formerly known as the Office for
Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), within DHHS and
establishes the basic structure under which IRBs review research. 3 1
The Common Rule requires informed consent of the subject or the
subject's legally authorized representative (LAR) in most cases, but
permits waiver of consent in minimal risk studies that could not
otherwise be carried out.'" The Common Rule also sets the
39
Although
requirements for approval of research protocols by IRBs.'1
it formally applies only to research that is directly conducted or
funded by the federal government,140 in practice its application is
much broader: most institutions, pursuant to contractual agreements
(assurances) entered into with the federal government, promise to

129. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 122, at Part C.1; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Medical
Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2003).
130. Id.
131. 46 Fed. Reg. 8366 (Jan. 26, 1981); see also Goldner, supra note 109, at 99.
132. 46 Fed. Reg. 8958-01 (Jan. 27, 1981).
133. 45 CFR 46 (1991).
134. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2005).
135. 21 C.F.R. pt.56 (2009); see also 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1999).
136. CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS 105 (2005).
137. Id. at 106.
138. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (d)(2) (2005).
139. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2001).
140. COLEMAN, supra note 136, at 106.
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apply the Common Rule to all research done at their facility
regardless of the source of funding.14 ' The FDA regulations also
utilize IRBs to review research.'4 2 The FDA regulations apply
regardless of the source of funding, but only to "clinical
investigations" involving drugs, medical devices, and biologics
intended for use in human beings.'4 3
Under both sets of regulations, IRBs are charged with the task
of reviewing protocols and consent documents. The regulations
generally require informed consent, but also provide for some
exceptions to this requirement. '" But as Dr. Katz has noted, these
regulations "still do not satisfactorily protect the rights of patientsubjects to inviolability of personhood and body" "I because that
would require a radical transformation of "the nature and quality of
the conversations between physician-investigators and patientsubjects about participation in research."' 46 He further states:
The drafters of the federal regulations should have
explicitly insisted that taking informed consent
seriously in research negotiations obligates physician
investigators to spend considerable time with
prospective patient-subjects. They should have
provided explicit instructions on the length to which
investigators must go in explaining themselves and
their intentions so that patient-subjects will not be
misled. . . .The drafters of the federal regulations

cautioned
physician-investigators
insufficiently
against viewing clinical research as an extension of
clinical practice."'
IRBs have been criticized for spending too much time
focusing on the sufficiency of consent forms and protection from
liability rather than on the consent process, and for not giving
sufficient scrutiny to the appropriateness of the research protocol.'48
141. Id. at 107.
142. 21 C.F.R. pt. 56 (2009).
143. 21 C.F.R. § 56.102 (2009), discussed in COLEMAN, supra note 136, at 143.
144. Garnett, supra note 65, at 475, n. 89 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2011) (listing "exceptions
from general requirements" of informed consent)); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c), (d) (2005).
145. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 9 (1993).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 24-25.
148. Garnett, supra note 65, at 478 (criticizing the relative lack of attention paid by IRBs to
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In 1998, the Office of Inspector General issued a report criticizing the
effectiveness of IRB activities.' 49 In recent years, OHRP and the FDA
have been somewhat more vigorous in scrutinizing the conduct of
clinical trials, citing a number of institutions for violations of federal
regulations and even suspending research activities at several.,o
There have also been a number of tort actions against prominent
researchers, academic medical centers, and even individual members
of IRBs, alleging research abuses including failure to obtain adequate
informed consent. Several of these cases have resulted in
settlements."'

In July 2011, DHHS issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking requesting comments on "how to better protect human
subjects involved in research, while facilitating valuable research and
reducing burden, delay and ambiguity for investigators." 5 2 The notice
states that current practices with respect to consent forms "have been
heavily criticized.""' The notice further states that although the
current rules require forms to include eight types of information, they
"frequently fail to include some of the most important pieces of
information that a person would need in order to make an
'enlightened decision' (to quote the Nuremberg Code) to enroll in a
research study,"' 5 4 and that the consent forms "often function as sales
documents, instead of genuine aids to good decision-making.""'
Moreover, forms have become longer and more difficult to
understand.' 6 Accordingly, a number of changes are being
contemplated, e.g. 1) more specific requirements on content; 2) limits
on length; 3) restrictions on inclusion of inappropriate content; 4)
reduction in "boilerplate" language; and 5) development of new
standardized templates."' But of course in an emergency situation,
the "propriety of the experiment itself").
149. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
(1998),
available at
REFORM
FOR
A TIME
REVIEW BOARDS:
INSTITUTIONAL

http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-0 1-97-00193.pdf.
150. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, RECENT COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT
DETERMINATIONS, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/findings/index.html (last
visited October 14, 2012).
151. Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in
Human Subjects Research, 139 ANN. INT. MED. 40 (2003).

152. Human Subjects Research Protections:Enhancing Protectionsfor Research Subjects and
Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (Jul. 26, 2011).
153.
154.

Id. at 44522.
Id.

155.

Id.

156.

Id.; at 44512, 44522.

157. Id. at 44523.
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there is not time to obtain informed consent so these reforms will
have no impact on the ERWC Rule.

III. THE ERWC RULE
Generally, the Common Rule requires "legally effective
informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized
representatives."' Under the Common Rule, IRBs are permitted to
waive the requirement of informed consent in "research [that]
involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects."' 59 Prior to 1996,
the FDA permitted waiver of consent only where the intervention was
necessary to save the life of the subject and held out the prospect of
direct benefit, 60 but the DHHS regulations required that the
experimental treatment involve no greater than minimal risk.161 In
light of the combined effect of these rules, many researchers believed
that Randomized Clinical Trials (RCTs) involving placebos were not
permissible in most emergency treatment contexts where patients or
proxies were unable to consent because a placebo was not necessary
to save the subject's life and more than minimal risk would typically

be involved.162
158. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005).
159. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2005).
160.

Norman Fost, Waived Consentfor Emergency Research, XXIV AM. J. OF LAW & MED.

163, 164 (1998).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 164, 167, and 169. For the history of the randomized clinical trial Ted J. Kaptchuk
notes:
World War II has been called the great divide in medical research and
certainly, for the placebo, this is true. In fact, the "powerful placebo" was born
in the vortex of one of medicine's most momentous transitions. Before World
War II the evaluation of new therapeutics was made by recognised leaders of
the medical profession whose judgments were based on clinical impressions,
and on rare occasions, poorly controlled evidence. In an effort to impose an
objective and scientific discipline onto the extraordinary postwar expansion of
medical research, the components of the double-blind RCT were adopted and
coalesced in the years after the war. The major features of these innovations
included blind assessment (usually meaning a placebo control), random
assignment to comparable groups, and inferential statistics as a surrogate for
determinism. The postwar placebo effect resulted from an almost sleight ofhand shift in the placebo's operational meaning in the new RCT model. Instead
of an inert sham given to individual patients, the placebo became the emblem
for all the healing occurring in the disguised "no-treatment" arm of an RCT.
The "placebo effect" encompassed all 'nonspecific effects' that did not depend
on the treatment in the active arm. The "powerful placebo" became a hodgepodge of non-linear, difficult to quantify, remnants collected under the rubric
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The ERWC rule was promulgated in reaction to a series of
events focusing attention on RCTs involving emergency medical
treatments. In 1993, the Office of Protection from Research Risks
(OPRR) instructed IRBs to stop approving studies using alternatives
to informed consent (e.g., implied consent, deferred consent, and
two-tiered consent) "despite their longstanding use in resuscitation
research."163 Previously, the FDA had shut down a study of active
compression CPR because of concerns about the use of deferred
consent and the study design." Also, the FDA had denied a waiver
of informed consent in an out-of-hospital study of a vest CPR device
that had been used in several studies utilizing deferred consent.'6 But
in 1993, the IRB at the University of Nebraska had obtained approval
from the FDA for research without consent in the Polyethylene
Glycol Superoxide Dismutase clinical trial, an interventional head
injury trial.166
In 1994, a House sub-committee chaired by Ron Wyden (DOregon) held hearings that focused on the confusion that had resulted
from the conflict between the FDA and DHHS rules and unethical
research practices by some manufacturers.' 67 Prior to the hearing, the
subcommittee issued a report prepared by its staff documenting
research abuses in emergency medical treatment trials.' 5 In response
to this report, representatives from the Society for Academic
Emergency Medicine (SAEM) entered into a dialogue with Wyden's
staff that resulted in the submission of a consensus statement from

(Continued from previous page)
of the dummy control of an RCT. Anything that threatened the fastidious
detection of a predictable cause and effect outcome was conveniently disposed
of in a repository labeled the "placebo effect." This new concept of placebo
was much larger both in meaning and power than its predecessor. It
incorporated many contributors to health outcomes such as natural history,
routine medical and nursing care, and the "art" of medicine that had once been
clearly distinct from the deception of an inert pill.
Ted J. Kaptchuk, Powerful Placebo: The Dark Side of the Randomised Controlled Trial, 351
LANCET 1722, 1723 (1998).
163. Biros, supra note 5, at 552; Fost, supra note 160, at 170.
164. Biros, supra note5, at 552; Fost, supra note 160, at 171.
165. Biros, supra note 5, at 552.
166. Id at 553.
167. Fost, supra note 163, at 171. (citing PROBLEMS IN SECURING INFORMED CONSENT OF
SUBJECTS INEXPERIMENTAL TRIALS OF UNAPPROVED DRUGS AND DEVICES: HEARINGS BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATION, BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 103d Cong. 49 (1994), available at Boston Public
Library Archives, http://www.archive.org/details/problemsinsecuri00unit).
168. Biros, supra note 5, at 553.
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SAEM and the formation of the Coalition of Acute Resuscitation and
Critical Care Researchers. 169 The Coalition convened a consensus
conference that produced a series of "recommendations that served as
a basis for the FDA's final rule."'
The ERWC rule was proposed in September 1995.17' The
preamble to the proposed rule noted that many standard emergency
medical treatments had "not been evaluated by adequate trials that
demonstrate either safety or effectiveness""' and that some trials had
provided evidence that standard treatments were "ineffective or even
harmful."'73 Thus, the agency was seeking its ERWC rule to provide
''access to potentially life-saving therapies" and "improvement of
therapies used in emergency medical situations that currently have

poor clinical outcomes.174
The final rule was adopted in October 1996.'" Although most
of the comments to the proposed rule were positive, the preamble to
the final rule noted:
Several objections to the proposed rule noted that the
major protection from research risk remains informed
consent and that without this procedure, potential
abuse of research subjects will always remain
unacceptably high; that it is unethical for patients who
cannot consent to receive nonstandard care; that
overriding individual autonomy and not obtaining
informed consent is unacceptable; that therapeutic
intent is not sufficient to obviate consent when there
are no data or when there is uncertainty or
disagreement. 76
In justifying the ERWC rule, the preamble argued that the
regulation was consistent with the Belmont Report insofar as it

169. Id. at 554.
170. Id.
171. 60 Fed. Reg. 49086 (Sept. 21, 1995).
172. Id. at 49086.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51498 (Oct. 2, 1996) (to
be codified at 21 CFR § 50.24 (2001)); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 51531 (Oct. 2, 1996) (DHHS did not
adopt a regulation but announced that it was waiving informed consent for research meeting the
requirements set forth in the FDA regulation.).
176. 61 Fed. Reg. 51498, 51499 (October 2, 1996).
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provides additional protections for persons with diminished
autonomy including community consultation, public disclosure of the
risks and benefits of the trial, public disclosure of the results of the
trial, establishing a data monitoring committee to monitor the trial,
and opportunity for a family member to object to the subject's
participation in the trial where consent is not feasible and a legally
authorized representative is not available within the therapeutic
window.'17
In order to approve a study under the final ERWC rule, the
IRB must find and document all of the following: 1) the subjects are
in "life-threatening" situations requiring the contemplated medical
intervention; 2) it is not possible to identify prospective subjects in
advance; 3) "available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory;" 4)
the research is necessary to determine the safety and effectiveness of
the medical intervention; 5) it is not feasible to obtain informed
consent from the subject due to his or her medical condition or from
the subject's LAR due to time constraints; 6) there is a prospect of
direct benefit to the subjects; 7) the research "could not practicably
be carried out without the waiver" of informed consent; and 8) the
sponsor is required to commit to attempt to contact the subject's LAR
within the "therapeutic window" to obtain consent. 7 1
Under the FDA version of the ERWC rule, the sponsor is
required to submit a separate investigational new drug (IND)
application or investigational device exemption (IDE) clearly
indicating that the protocol involves research without consent even
though there is an existing IND or IDE for the product.179 The FDA
must approve the new protocol in writing before the study can
begin.'8 0 The DHHS waiver requirements are substantially identical
and apply where the research is subject to FDA regulations and
carried out under a new IND/IDE. Or, if the protocol is not subject to
FDA regulations, the IRB must report to the OPPR (now OHPR) that

177. Id.
178. Exception from Informed Consent Requirements for Emergency Research, 21 C.F.R. §
50.24 (2001)
179. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (d) (2001).
180. GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND
SPONSORS: EXCEPTION FROM INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESEARCH

available
2011),
(Mar.
4
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatoryinformation/Guidances/UCM249673.pdf
"Guidance").

at
(hereinafter
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it has found and documented that the protocol complies with the FDA
regulations.'"'
The ERWC rule requires "additional protections" for research
subjects in emergency medical treatment trials where consent is
waived, e.g., 1) consultation with the communities where the research
will be conducted and from where the subjects will be drawn; 2)
public disclosure to the affected communities of the study design and
its risks; 3) public disclosure to affected communities after the
completion of the research of its results and "the demographic
characteristics of the research population;" 4) an "independent data
monitoring board to oversee the research;" 5) where it is not feasible
to obtain informed consent from the subject or the subject's LAR
within "the therapeutic window," attempting to contact family
members; and 6) establishing procedures to inform the subject after
the fact of his or her inclusion in the trial (or, where the subject is
incapacitated, the subject's LAR or family members), the contents of
the informed consent document, and the right to withdraw from the
trial "without penalty or loss of benefits."'
In May 2005, a breakout session was held at the Academic
Emergency Medicine Consensus Conference that focused on the
requirements of the ERWC rule.' This conference resulted in several
recommendations: 1) that "life-threatening condition" should be
expanded to include serious disability; 84 2) it should be permissible
to consider existing therapies "unsatisfactory" even if they are
"partially effective;"8 5 and 3) IRBs should not grant a waiver in the
absence of evidence that the experimental therapy will provide a
direct benefit to the patient. 86 There were also concerns expressed
about the "undue barriers to performing important resuscitation
research," and "variable or erratic IRB interpretation."
Finally,
there was a call for more research on the most effective methods of
implementing the community consultation and public notice
requirements of the ERWC rule.'

181. 61 Fed. Reg. 51531 (Oct. 2, 1996)
182. 21 C.F.R. §50.24 (2001).
183. Drew Watters, Michael B. Sayre & Robert Silbergeit, Research Conditions that Qualify
for Emergency Exception from Informed Consent, 12 ACAD. EMERG. MED. I 040, 1040 (2005).
184. Id. at 1042.
185. Id
186. Id. at 143.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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In March 2011, DHHS and the FDA released additional
guidance on the ERWC rule for IRBs, sponsors, and researchers that
addressed some of the concerns raised at the 2005 Consensus
Conference.189 This finalized an earlier draft guidance published in
2006. This document is not law, but provides "the Agency's current
thinking" on the topic.190 The guidance document states that the FDA
and DHHS regulations do not preempt state laws, and accordingly
state law could preclude approval of research without consent even
though the protocol meets the requirement of the federal
regulations."' As to the requirement of the "prospect of direct
benefit," the guidance notes that "information from animal and
preclinical studies, other clinical data .

.

. or other evidence should

support the potential for the investigational product to provide a
direct benefit to the individual subjects."1 9 2
With respect to the requirement that the IRB find that
"available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory," the guidance
clarifies that "unproven" means that "there is not substantial evidence
that the treatment is effective for the condition of interest."
"Unsatisfactory" refers to situations where there is an approved
treatment, but the treatment is unsatisfactory due to "safety" or
"efficacy" issues.'9 With respect to the requirement that the IRB find
that a study "could not practicably be carried out without the waiver
from informed consent," the guidance states that the waiver should
not be available where results from trials with consenting subjects
could be generalized to non-consenting subjects, or where research
"would not be unduly delayed" by using consenting subjects.194 The
guidance also notes that there may be emergency situations where an
individual is conscious and able to communicate and indicates that he
or she does not want to participate in the emergency research study,
some other evidence (e.g., medical jewelry or a wallet card) indicates
that the individual would not want to participate, or an LAR or family
member who is present indicates the individual does not want to
participate. In such cases, the refusal to participate should be
honored.'"9

189. See Guidance, supra note 180.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id at 8.
Id at 10.
Id. at 11.

195.

Guidance, supra note 180, at 14.
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Under the guidance, the IRB is required to review the plans
for "community consultation" and "public disclosure" before
approving the protocol."' Community consultation activities are
supposed to ensure that the communities where the research is
conducted and the potential subjects are provided adequate
information about the risks and benefits of the research and have an
opportunity to ask questions about the research and express their
views on it prior to IRB approval.' The guidance provides some
additional information on the FDA's expectations with respect to the
goals of "community consultation," i.e. 1) showing respect for
persons by informing the community in advance about the study; 2)
providing an opportunity for "meaningful input" from community
members prior to approval of the study; 3) showing respect for
community members by allowing its representatives "to identify
potential community-level concerns and effects of the research;" and
4) showing respect for the autonomy of the subjects.'"9
The guidance defines "the community in which the research
will be conducted" as "the geographic area. . .where the hospital or
clinical investigator site is located."' 99 And "the community from
which the subjects will be drawn" is defined as "the group of patients
who share a particular medical or characteristic that increases the
likelihood that they (or a family member) may be enrolled in the
study." 20 0 The guidance specifically notes:
Community Consultation is not the same as
community consent. Community consent is the idea
that a community's leaders can consent to the
community's participation in a study, and thereby
eliminate the need for researchers to obtain informed
consent from individual subjects. Community consent
is not a substitute for individual informed consent . .
.nor can the community consent on behalf of
individual members to permit their participation in a
study. The usual way of respecting a person's
autonomy-by directly obtaining the individual's
consent-may be impossible for emergency research.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. 18.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, community consultation cannot substitute
consent, although community
for individual
consultation does represent an opportunity for people
situated similarly to potential study subjects to hear
about the study and express views about it.20'
During community consultation, sponsors and investigators
are supposed to inform the relevant communities that informed
consent will not be obtained from the research subjects and explain
why not.202 All "relevant aspects" of the study are to be explained
including the protocol design, its risks and benefits, and why current
treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory. 203 Sponsors and
investigators are also supposed to get feedback from the communities
on the proposed research.204
As to why community consultation is important the guidance
notes that it "provides an opportunity for communit[ies] to
understand the proposed clinical investigation and its risks and
expected benefits, and to discuss the investigation."2 05 It is also
designed to "strengthen community confidence in the role of the IiRB
2 06
and its decision-making capacity. . ."
It is contemplated that the sponsor will pay the costs of the
community consultation activities.2 07 The IRB is supposed to review
the research protocol and the plans for community consultation as a
package.2 08 Although the sponsor is required to provide the IRB plans
for community consultation and public disclosure prior to the start of
the study,2 09 the preferred approach now is for researchers, ethicists,
and members of the IRB to work collaboratively to develop the
community consultation process.2 10
There are a variety of methods that can be used for
community consultations, e.g., town hall meetings, focus groups,
201. Guidance, supra note 180, at 26
202. Id. at 26.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Id. at 27.
206. Id. at 28.
207. Guidance, supra note 180, at 28.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Tom P. Aufderheide, MCW Experience Implementing Community Consultation:
Strengths and Weaknesses (2008), available at http://www.powershow.com/view/7b2d8NDIjY/MCWExperienceImplementingCommunityConsultationStrengths andWeaknesses
flashpptpresentation.
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random-digit-dialing, or a combination of these methods, but they all
have shortcomings.21 ' Due to poor and biased attendance, the town
hall approach may be the least effective, and it takes substantial effort
and expense to make it worthwhile.2 12 The feedback from the specific
focus group may not reflect the attitudes of the wider community.213
And while random-digit-dialing is possibly most inclusive and less
prone to bias, it provides no direct interaction with investigators.2 14
The extent of community consultation is left to the discretion
of the IRB. 2 15 The IRB may conduct the community consultation
activities itself, and even if the sponsors conduct them, the FDA
recommends that IRB members attend the community consultation
activities.2 16 The IRB is supposed to consider any concerns or
objections raised during the community consultation activities. 2 17 The
regulation does not require that an "opt-out" mechanism be provided
for community members who do not want to participate in the
subject.2 8 But the IRB can require that an opt-out mechanism be
provided. 2 19 Opt-out mechanisms can include a medical bracelet or
card to be carried in a wallet. 2 20 If an opt-out mechanism is used, then
members of the community should be made aware of them through
the community consultation activities and public disclosure.22'
IV.

THE ARGUMENTS MADE AGAINST THE ERWC RULE

There are essentially four arguments that have been made
against the ERWC rule: A) informed consent is an absolute
requirement; B) many patients would not want to participate in
research trials without being consulted; C) the use of community
consultation is not an adequate substitute for informed consent; and
D) it does not adequately protect patients.22 2

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Guidance, supra note 180, at 31.
Id at 17.
Id at 18.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Guidance, supra note 180, at 30.
Fost, supra note 160, at 173.
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A. INFORMED CONSENT IS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT

Although patient autonomy is generally acknowledged to be
the trump value in the treatment context, 223 in clinical research it is in
constant tension with the desire to benefit society. Unfortunately, as
noted supra, there have been many examples in history where
abandonment of the informed consent requirement has led to horrific
consequences for the subjects. And notwithstanding its potential
benefit to society, participation in emergency medical treatment
research entails risks that could have a dramatic and lasting impact on
the individual. Not all experimental emergency medical treatment
measures are successful, and the research subject could die or be left
with severe disabilities due to inclusion in the trial. Individuals who
are suffering life-threatening medical conditions, or who have been
incapacitated by severe physiologic stress or derangement should be
considered vulnerable and incapable of consenting.
It could be argued that when an individual is in extremis (such
as a cardiac arrest, or when unconscious), they would give implied
consent to any standard emergency treatment. This is true, and is a
basic norm of ethics in emergency medicine in the treatment context
as currently taught and practiced in the United States. Without
explicit information to the contrary (such as a conversation with the
patient or family, or a written document such as a "living will"), it is
presumed that all individuals would want physicians to attempt to
preserve their lives. But using this same line of reasoning to justify
ERWC fails to recognize the basic difference between accepted
standards of care for the benefit of the individual undergoing
treatment and experimental or research activities carried out on a
patient primarily for the benefit of others. While implied consent is
the norm in the treatment situation (e.g., use of generally accepted
medical actions for resuscitation), it should not be the norm for
research activity, precisely because of the need to respect and protect
research subjects as much as possible from experimental treatments
that may not benefit them .
It is generally assumed that the informed consent process
should be more rigorous in the research context than in the treatment
context. 224 There are several reasons for this. First, the risks of the

223. Wolpe, supra note 37; see also David J. Smolin, Does Bioethics Provide Answers?
Secular andReligious Bioethics and Our Procreative Future, 35 CUMB. L. REv. 473, 477 (2005).
224. Carnahan, supra note 52, at 575.
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innovative treatment may not be well known.2 25 Second, research is
not conducted primarily for the benefit of the research subjects and
participation in the trial may not benefit the subject. 226 Third, research
subjects may be operating under a "therapeutic misconception," i.e.
they may have an unrealistic belief that they will benefit from
participation in the research study. 227 Fourth, while in the treatment
context it may be assumed that the physician acts primarily for the
benefit of the patient, this is not the case in the research context
where there are "conflicting interests." 228 The motives of the
researcher may include not only the desire to benefit society and
contribute to knowledge, but also to derive potential financial benefit
and enhance one's professional reputation.229
Jay Katz, one of the leading proponents of informed consent,
characterized the ERWC rule as an unfortunate abandonment of the
first principle of the Nuremberg Code. 230 He also believed that it sent
a "dangerous message" to researchers that proceeding with their
research was more important than obtaining consent for subjects.2 3'
Katz also criticized the ERWC rule for its obfuscation of the
research/therapy distinction and the vast and vaguely defined
discretion granted to IRBs in administering these fateful
regulations." 23 2 He further noted:
If the FDA is serious that the waiver of informed
consent is a "serious matter," then the agency should
rescind the regulations and draft new ones that are
narrower in scope and more explicit about the

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Rebecca Dresser, THE UBIQUITY AND UTILITY OF THE THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION,
19 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 271 (2002); Paul S. Applebaum, et al., False Hopes and Best Data:
Consent to Research and the Therapeutic Misconception, 17 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 20 (Apr.
1987).
228. Carnahan, supra note 52, at 575. As Jay Katz has noted in the research context,
"[I]ndividual patient-centered therapy gives way to a collective patient-centered endeavor in
which the abstraction of the research question tends to objectify the person-patient." Katz, supra
note 145, at 15-16.
229. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000).
230. Gina Kolata, Ban on Medical Experiments Without Consent is Relaxed, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/05/sciencelban-on-medical-experiments-

without-consent-is-relaxed.html?pagewanted=all&src-pm.
231. Id
232. Jay Katz, Blurring the Lines: Research, Therapy, and IRBs, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9
(Jan.-Feb. 1997).
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permissible limits of nontherapeutic research in
emergency care research. As currently drafted, they
represent a triumph of the pharmaceutical industry,
and the research
medical device companies,
community--over the therapeutic interests of patientsubjects as well as society's interests in limiting the
authority of the state and the investigators to conscript
subjects for research without their consent.23 3
On the other hand, Norman Fost argued that "[c]ontrary to the
first principle of the Nuremberg Code, the voluntary consent of the
human subject is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethically and
legally responsible research in the United States."23 4 He contended
that consent is "primarily. . .a way of allowing patient autonomy to
express itself' and that "it is certainly not an absolute."235 Baruch
Brody viewed the ERWC rule "as a mature recognition of the
existence of multiple values surrounding the research effort," but also
acknowledged that it is "wrong" to use people without their consent
or the consent of their proxy for risky research. He further argued that
the regulations "only make sense when you stop seeing the moral
world as governed by these types of absolute values."236
B. MANY PATIENTS WOULD NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
TRIALS WITHOUT BEING CONSULTED

It could be argued that subjects may want to participate in
trials under the ERWC rule in order to gain access to innovative
treatments otherwise unavailable, and thus would consent if they
could. Fost argues that since there is a greater likelihood that
emergency/critical care patients will be exposed to "innovative
treatment," patients participating in a clinical trial of emergency
medical treatment may actually be provided more protection than
patients receiving innovative treatments that are not participants in a
clinical trial.237 On the other hand, George Annas argues that
randomization is still problematic: "Most people would not want a
doctor to flip a coin when they come into an emergency room.
233.
234.

Id.at1l.
Fost, supra note 160, at 163.

235.

Id. at 173.

236. Baruch A. Brody, New Perspectives on Emergency Room Research, 27 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 7 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
237.

Fost, supra note 160, at 175-76.
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[T]hey would want their doctor to do what is best for them... [T]hat
is what you lose in this-you lose the right to have your doctor treat
you however he thinks best." 238 And he further states: "For most
people, research is not an opportunity . . . The average person wants
treatment, not an opportunity to be researched on . .. [T]he idea that
people might be denied new treatments is silly . . . If we knew it

would work, it would be a treatment." 23 9 But Fost, relying on results
from the use of deferred consent in a 1990 randomized placebo trial
involving the use of calcium channel blockers in comatose survivors
of cardiac arrest, argues that most patients and families would prefer
the opportunity to receive experimental treatment where the standard
treatment is associated with poor outcomes. 240
At this time, it is unclear whether the ERWC rule is
acceptable to the public.241 Indeed, there appears to be some
dissonance between the approach taken by the ERWC rule and public
attitudes. In a survey of patients in an emergency department, Wilets
et al. (2003) found a significant level of mistrust of researchers with
49 percent of the respondents equating research subjects with "human
guinea pigs." 2 42 In a survey of patients in the emergency department
of a tertiary care center conducted prior to the implementation of the
rules authorizing waiver of informed consent in emergency treatment
research, Smithline & Gerstle (1998) found that 73 percent of those
surveyed approved of research without consent where the absolute
risks of the research were minimal, but only 50 percent if the absolute
risks were more than minimal and outweighed by the potential
benefits.243
Abboud et al. (2006) surveyed adult patients in an urban
emergency department (ED) and a geriatric clinic (GC) about their
willingness to participate in a research involving treatments for
cardiopulmonary arrest. Those surveyed were asked to imagine that
they had been brought to the emergency room for cardiopulmonary
arrest and that their chance of survival was less than 1 percent. They
found that 30 percent (ED) to 50 percent (GC) of those surveyed
238. Kolata, supra note 230.
239. Id
240. Fost, supra note 160, at 179.
241. Jan Lecourturier et al., Clinical Research Without Consent in Adults in the Emergency
Setting: A Review ofPatient and Public Views, 9 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS 9 (2008).
242. Ilene Wilets et al., How Patients and Visitors to an Urban Emergency Department View
ClinicalResearch, 10 AcAD. EMERG. MED. 1081 (2003).
243. Howard A. Smithline & Michael A. Gerstle, Waiver of Informed Consent: A Survey of
Emergency Medicine Patients, 16 AM. J. EM. MED. 90 (1998).
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would not want to participate in a randomized clinical trial of a new
drug that involved a waiver of consent.24 On this basis, they
concluded "that a consistently high level of altruism cannot be
assumed."24 5 Longfield et al (2008) found that while 82 percent of
attendees at community consultation meetings for the PolyHeme
study approved of its conduct in their community, 35 percent of
persons objected to enrollment in the study without prior consent.246
Richardson et al. (2005) conducted focus groups for residents of
buildings in New York City where the PAD trial was ongoing finding
that while there was "significant" support for research without
consent, there was also some adamant opposition to it. 24 7 On the other
hand, Dix et al. (2004) found that all of the 137 attendees at seven
community consultation sessions approved of research without
consent for a study of brain trauma patients brought to an emergency
room. 248
Dula (1997) has argued that the ERWC rule is particularly
problematic in the African-American community. She notes that
African-Americans will be disproportionately subjected to the waiver
of informed consent because a large number of trauma centers are
located in University-affiliated public hospitals serving inner cities.249
And they suffer a disproportionate number of firearm related
traumatic injuries. She then notes:
[I]mplementation of the new regulations will be
difficult in minority populations because of the history
of abuse of informed consent. African Americans have
historically been subjects of medical experiments
without consent, without benefit to themselves, and
often without benefit to science. Many will wonder
what's different about this latest abrogation of
244. P.A. Abboud et al., What Determines Whether Patients are Willing to Participate in
Resuscitation Studies Requiring Exception from Informed Consent, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 468
(2008), availableathttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563379/pdf/468.pdf
245. Id. at 471.
246. Jenice N. Longfield et al., Community Meetings for Emergency Research Community
Consultation, 36 CRIT. CARE MED. 731 (2008).
247. Lynne D. Richardson et al., Research Without Consent: Community Perspectivesfrom
the Community Voices Study, 12 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1082, 1089 (2005).
248. Emily S. Dix et al., Implementation of Community Consultationfor Waiver of Informed
Consent in Emergency Research: One Institutional Review Board'sExperience, 52 J. INVESTIG.
MED. 113 (2004).
249. Annette Dula, Bearing the Brunt of the New Regulations: Minority Populations, 27
HASTINGS CTR. REP. I 1(Jan.-Feb. 1997).
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informed consent. Is this yet another opportunity to
force African Americans to be guinea pigs for "white"
science? 25 0
In the preamble to the proposed ERWC rule, the FDA argued that it
would be likely to increase the enrollment of minority and low
income patients in critical care studies. But as Saver notes, the FDA
failed to acknowledge that "[m]any African-Americans. . .are
suspicious of enrolling in clinical trials because of the historic and
disproportionate abuse of black patients in the name of medical
research, often without their consent." 25 1 Saver further argues that
simply waiving consent does not adequately address the attitudes in
the African-American community, and does not sufficiently respect
the autonomy of members of that community. 25 2 In a study of the
implementation of the public disclosure requirement of the ERWC
rule, Shah and Sugarman (2003) found that community members
expressed concerns about racial bias in almost one-third of the
documented two-way communications (e.g., open public meetings,
meetings with specific groups in the community, telephone poll, talkradio program with call in).253
C. COMMUNITY CONSULTATION IS NOT AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR
INFORMED CONSENT

Although community consultation is not equivalent to
community consent,25 4 it plays a significant role in justifying the
waiver of informed consent. 255 Richardson (2006) argues that
"community consultation serves several important ethical purposes
particularly in the absence of informed consent," e.g., promotion of
"trust among community members;" encouragement of "trustworthy
behavior by researchers;" revelation of additional risks to subjects;

250.
251.

Id.
Richard Saver, CriticalCare Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REV. 205, 253

(1996) (citing Protection of Human Subjects: Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086, 49,093
(Sept. 21,1995)).
252. Id. at 254.
253. Amit Navin Shah & Jeremy Sugarman, ProtectingResearch Subjects Under the Waiver
of Informed Consentfor Emergency Research: Experiences with Efforts to Inform the Community,
41 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 72, 77 (Jan. 2003).
254. Biros, supra note 5, at 558.
255. Lynne D. Richardson et al., The Role of Community Consultation in the Ethical Conduct
of Research Without Consent, 6 AM. J.OF BIOETHICS 33 (May/June 2006).
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and suggestions for improvement of the protocol.256 A 2002 report by
the Institute of Medicine (1M) assessing the system for protecting
research subjects noted:
The notion of community consultation increasingly is
viewed as beneficial to participants, to investigators,
and to the integrity of the study design . . . . It is

especially critical when the investigator is not a
member of, or is unfamiliar with, the community that
is the focus of or the host for the research. However,
the idea of "community consent" has been problematic
for several reasons, but largely because of the
difficulty involved in defining communities.
Communities are defined by social and ethnic group
boundaries, which are highly permeable and fluid.
Individuals rarely reside fully in one group over time
and place and often belong to more than one
community. In addition, communities are more often
socially rather than biologically constructed, and
individuals self-define their communities.2 57
The IOM report further noted the difficulty of "identifying the
spokesperson(s) for a particular community or ethnic group for the
purpose of obtaining a community or group's consent."258 It also
recommended steps to strengthen the community consultation
process, including requiring researchers "in their grant proposals, to
justify their selection and definition of communities; to demonstrate
sensitivity to the possible community implications of their 259research
where appropriate; and to anticipate potential group harms."
Community consultation is insufficient for several reasons.
First, within a single community, there is a diversity of viewpoints
and perceptions as to the validity and necessity of the proposed
research. It is unclear how such community disparities are to be

256.
257.

Id. at 33.
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addressed by the governing IRBs.2 60 Further, there is no basis for
assuming that the individual upon whom the research is conducted
shares the viewpoint of those who approve research under such
circumstances.
Second, the individual selected as a subject for the research
may not actually be a member of the community that was consulted
about the appropriateness of the research protocol. Approval of the
protocol is based on consultation with members of the particular
geographic community. If the community raises significant
objections to the protocol during the consultation phase, then
investigators may decide not to pursue that place as a site for
research, or the local IRB may refuse to approve the protocol.2 6 1 But
travelers, visitors, or individuals passing through a particular locality
where an emergency medical treatment protocol has been approved,
and who may have never heard of the research activity, could be
placed into the research protocol simply by the fact of their presence
in the community at the time they experience a medical emergency
regardless of the lack of informed consent or any involvement by
their home community in approval of the protocol.
Third, community consultation is not the equivalent of valid
proxy/surrogate consent. Typically, proxy/surrogate consent requires
that another individual, usually (but not necessarily) related to the
research subject, make an informed decision on behalf of the
incapacitated subject. This individual is one who should have some
knowledge of the subject's wishes and desires and generally is able to
understand and respect the faith perspective of the subject.
Sometimes the surrogate/proxy is designated in advance by the
subject. Usually, the surrogate/proxy is supposed to apply a
substituted judgment standard, i.e., to do what the subject would do if
the subject had decision-making capacity. When that evidence is
lacking, then the proxy is supposed to decide in accordance with the
best interests of the subject. On the other hand, approval of research
without consent presumes that if they could, individuals enrolled in
the trial would give permission to participate, but this may not be the
case. Community preferences as revealed during community
consultation may be in direct opposition to an individual's deeply

260.

Richardson et al., supra note 255; see also Michelle Biros et al., Community Attitudes
RESUSCITATION 1382

Towards Emergency Research and Exception from Informed Consent, 80
(2009).
261. Biros, supra note 260, at 1385.
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held beliefs. Thus the subject's beliefs are not treated as having any
value unless they happen to coincide with what the community deems
to be appropriate for its own good.
Richardson (2005) notes that "there is no consensus regarding
the definition of 'community' or appropriate methods of consultation
or notification regarding research without consent." 262 Some have
questioned the efficacy of current methods used in community
consultation. 263 Holloway (2006) particularly questioned its efficacy
in the African-American community noting: "Community
consultation is a performative process that takes on the character and
conduct of proxy without its authority." 21 Holloway focused on the
PolyHeme study that was conducted at Duke University. This multisite Phase III RCT involved the use of a blood substitute in 720
trauma patients at Level I victims both at the scene of an accident and
for twelve hours after reaching the hospital even though whole blood
was available in the hospital setting. Holloway notes that Duke's
attempts at community consultation involved four (reportedly poorly
attended) information sessions, a slot on a Rotary Club's meeting
agenda, two sessions at a mall, and a session at a Fourth of July
baseball game, while requests to speak to two black churches were
rebuffed. 2 65 Dula (1997) also noted that it is more difficult to
implement the community consultation requirement in AfricanAmerican communities.266 Due to the legacy of mistrust, she believes
that investigators "will have difficulty in gaining entry to minority
communities." And she argues it will particularly be difficult to make
contact with drug dealers and gang members, the most likely
participants in the research trial.267
On the other hand, Dickert & Sugarman (2006) argue that if
its goals and methods are properly understood, community
consultation can play an important role in identifying the issues
raised by Holloway.268 They acknowledge that community

262. Richardson et al., supra note 255, at 1089.
263. See, e.g., Karla F.C. Holloway, Accidental Communities: Race, Emergency Medicine,
and the Problem of PolyHeme, 6 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 7 (May/June 2006); Nicole Delorio &
Katie McClure, Does Emergency Exception from Informed Consent Process Protect Research
Subjects?, 12 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1056 (Nov. 2005); Terri Schmidt et al., The Meaning of
Community Consultation, 6 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 30 (May/June 2006).
264. Holloway, supra note 263, at 13.
265. Id.
266. Dula, supra note 249.
267. Id.
268. Neal W. Dickert & Phoebe R. Berman, Community Consultation: Not the Problem-An
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consultation is not the equivalent of community consent and "should
not be seen to be a proxy for consent."26 9 They posit that the ethical
goals of community consultation are: "1) enhanced protection; 2)
enhanced benefits; 3) legitimacy; and 4) shared responsibility." 27 0
They concede, however, that "how to perform community
consultation well is poorly understood" and that more studies are
needed on "how different methods of consultation advance the goals
that community consultation is designed to receive."
While it is generally acknowledged that community
consultation is the most difficult aspect of obtaining a waiver of
informed consent, research on its effectiveness is somewhat
limited.2 72 McClure et al. (2003) surveyed patients, family members
and visitors in the waiting rooms of emergency departments at two
academic medical centers conceming their attitudes on the waiver of
informed consent in emergency medical research and the community
consultation process. 27 3 Both centers were sites for the Public Access
to Defibrillation Study (PAD) in which a waiver of informed consent
had been approved. 88 percent of those responding to the surveyor's
questions agreed with the general statement that informed consent of
the subject should be required before enrollment in a research study.
34 percent agreed that enrolling subjects without informed consent
was acceptable in a research situation. 70 percent indicated their
willingness to participate in an emergency treatment study without
informed consent "if it were important to learn about the treatment
for a condition that currently has no good treatment." 2 74 As to
community consultation, 73 percent disagreed with the statement that
informing the community before doing a study without consent is not
necessary. 45 percent believed that using community consultation as
a substitute for informed consent was reasonable, and 50 percent
indicated they would attend a community consultation meeting, yet
only 5 percent knew of the ongoing PAD trial.275

Important Partof the Solution, 6 AM. J. OF BIOETHICs 26 (May/June 2006).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.at27.
272. Jill M. Baren & Michelle H. Biros, The Research on Community Consultation: An
Annotated Bibliography, 14 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 346 (2007).
273. Katie B. McClure et al., Attitudes of Emergency Department Patients and Visitors
Regarding Emergency Exception from Informed Consent in Resuscitation Research, Community
Consultation,and PublicNotification, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 352 (Apr. 2003).
274. Id. at 355.
275. Id.
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Triner et al. (2007) surveyed emergency department patients
in an urban academic medical center concerning their awareness of
the ongoing PolyHeme trial being conducted in the community. 276
The survey was taken after community consultation and public
notification. Only 8 percent of those surveyed were aware of the trial
and only 4 percent were aware of specific risks. They also found that
the population of potential enrollees did not indicate a high degree of
acceptance of these enrollment practices.
Nelson et al. (2008) studied the efficacy of methods
(community meetings, random-access dialing, and website) used for
community consultation in the ROC hypertonic saline trial. 277 The
community meeting consisted of both open forums that were
advertized in local media, and presentations to organized community
groups. After these meetings, attendees filled out a paper survey. 278 In
the random-access survey, callers were provided with a standardized
script and survey questions. Finally, a website was designed with
information about the study and a link to a survey. 27 9 They found that
open forum meetings, the most frequently used method of community
consultation, "may be an ineffective [means of consultation] because
of both poor attendance and high rates of agreement with the
proposed study."28 0
D.

THE

ERWC RULE DOES

NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR
PATIENTS

Due to the dearth of published studies and appropriate
outcome measures, it is unclear whether the ERWC rule provides
adequate protection for research subjects.2 8' There are additional
concerns where one arm of the trial will be deprived of the standard
treatment. One of the prerequisites to approval of a trial under the
ERWC rule is that the IRB find that "available treatments are
unproven or unsatisfactory." And as noted supra, the 2011 guidance
permits trials where "there is not substantial evidence that the
276. Wayne Triner et al., Exceptionfrom Informed ConsentEnrollment in Emergency Medical
Research:Attitudes andAwareness, 14 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED 187 (2007).
277. Maria Nelson et al., Community Consultation Methods in a Study Using Exception to
Informed Consent, 12 PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 417 (Oct.-Dec. 2008).

278. Id.at418.
279. Id. at 418-19.
280. Id. at 423.
281. Nicole Delorio & Katie McClure, Does Emergency Exception from Informed Consent
ProcessProtect Research Subjects?, 12 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1056 (Nov. 2005).
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treatment is effective for the condition of interest," or where there is
an approved treatment, but it is unsatisfactory due to "safety" or
''efficacy" issues.
Richard Saver argues that the ERWC rule as initially
proposed had embraced "too lax a standard of 'clinical equipoise' for
guiding IRBs in determining whether the risks of the experiment and
the state of medical uncertainty warrant waiver of consent."28 2 He
particularly criticizes the definition of clinical equipoise set forth in
the preamble to the proposed rule, i.e., "clinical equipoise would
exist. . .whenever at least a reasonable minority of medical
professionals believe the experimental treatment would be as good as,
or better than, the standard treatment."28 3 This definition of clinical
equipoise was reaffirmed in the preamble to the final rule where it
was stated: "The agency thinks that this description provides
sufficient guidance to IRBs and that it is appropriate to allow IRBs to
determine when clinical equipoise exists."28 4
In his criticism, Saver argues that the FDA should embrace
the standard for clinical equipoise proposed by Benjamin Freedman,
i.e., "a sufficient state of medical uncertainty should exist within the
clinical community and the research itself should be designed so that
the experiment itself will make a difference in resolving the medical
issues [emphasis in original]."2 85 He contends that trial must be
designed so that it will provide "generalizable, acceptable
answers."28 6 Thus, he argues for special scrutiny of the soundness of
the research proposal noting that the failure to ensure that the trial is
well designed is particularly problematic where consent is waived.287
The preamble to the final EWRC rule states that ". . .an IRB should
not approve a clinical investigation that is poorly designed and, thus,
unable to answer the scientific question posed,"2 88 but it does not
provide any additional guidance to IRBs concerning study design.
Saver also argues that the rule as originally proposed did not
provide adequate guidance to IRBs in determining whether the
risk/benefit calculus of the protocol was acceptable. He argues that

282. Saver, supra note 251, at 268.
283. Id. at 255 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 49086, at 49095 (Sept. 21, 1995)).
284. 61 Fed. Reg. 51498, 51508 (Oct. 2, 1996).
285. Saver, supra note 251, at 256 (citing Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of
ClinicalResearch, 31 NEw ENG. J. MED. 141,144 (1987)).
286. Id. at 258
287. Id.

288.
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there should be a mechanism in place to ensure that the experimental
therapy provided under the protocol would be equal to or better than
the standard treatment. 28 9 The proposed rule merely required that the
"risk of the investigation is reasonable in light of what is known
about the medical condition and the risks and benefits of current
therapy, if any, and what is known about the risks and benefits of the
proposed intervention or activity." 290 The final EWRC rule provides
an additional requirement: the IRB must document that "appropriate
animal and other preclinical studies have been conducted, and the
information derived from those studies and related evidence support
the potential for the intervention to provide a direct benefit to the
subjects."291
Notwithstanding these safeguards, the ERWC Rule opens the
door to studies like the PolyHeme Study, discussed supra, where
patients are deprived of standard treatment without their consent.
Similarly, the ROC CCC study, discussed supra, also involves
depriving patients of the standard AHA approved treatment, i.e., CPR
with intermittent ventilation. In both studies, it was contended that
there is clinical equipoise because the standard treatments were
unsatisfactory or unproven and the experimental intervention may be
as good or better based on prior studies. If studies are to be approved
on this basis under the ERWC rule, then it is important that IRBs
carefully scrutinize these claims.
Katz was particularly concerned about placebo trials.292
Certainly, under the principle of clinical equipoise, it is more difficult
to justify depriving patients in one arm of the trial of the standard
treatment. Fost argues that placebo trials could be justified where
both groups are provided with the standard treatment and only one
group is provided with an additional experimental treatment. He
contends that most people would not object to participation in this
type of placebo trial. 293 But the regulations leave the door open to
placebo trials where standard treatment is not provided. 2 94 Katz notes:
The FDA tried to reassure critics that "[I]n virtually all
cases, when a placebo is used, standard care, if any,
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Saver, supra note 251, at 269.
60 Fed. Reg. 49086 (Sept. 21, 1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 49100 (Sept. 21, 1995).
21 CFR §50.24 (a)(3)(ii) (2001).
Kolata, supra note 230.
Fost, supra note 160, at 180.
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would be given to all subjects, with subjects
randomized to receive, in addition, the test treatment
or a placebo" . . . Why not in all cases? The FDA

discusses only one exception, "the situation in which
the test is to determine whether standard treatment is
in fact useful. In that case, there must be a group that
does not receive it" . . . Is this the only exception? And

on what criteria is "not useful" based? And why
should not in these situations standard treatment be
compared with promising experimental treatments? Is
the exception introduced in order to justify the fateful,
unelaborated, and apodictic next sentence: "The
agency believes that it is important to recognize in the
regulation, that placebo-controlled trials may be
conducted under this emergency research provision;
thus it is retaining the wording of this section"

Why?295
The 2011 guidance states that "in virtually all cases when a
placebo is used, standard care (if any) would be given to all subjects,
with subjects randomized additionally to receive either a test
treatment or a placebo." 296 But it also notes an exception to this
requirement where "the study objective is to determine whether some
aspect of the standard treatment is in fact useful."29 7 The guidance
continues:
Sponsors designing trials that include subjects who
neither receive some aspect of the standard treatment
nor a test article should provide a sound rationale for
this type of study design. Choosing an appropriate
design for these studies may be particularly
challenging. FDA recommends that sponsors consult
with the appropriate FDA office or division about the
proposed study design.29 8

295.
296.
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V. POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH CATHOLIC TEACHING
Generally, the principles in the Nuremberg Code, the
Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report are consistent with
"Catholic teaching on the natural law and the intrinsic dignity of the
human person."29 9 But there is some discordance in these documents
on the propriety of research without consent. While under the
Nuremberg Code research without consent is illicit, it may be
permissible under the current version of the Declaration of Helsinki
which provides:
Research on individuals from whom it is not possible
to obtain consent, including proxy or advance consent,
should be done only if the physical/mental condition
that prevents obtaining informed consent is a
necessary characteristic of the research population.
The specific reasons for involving research subjects
with a condition that renders them unable to give
informed consent should be stated in the experimental
protocol for consideration and approval of the review
committee. The protocol should state that consent to
remain in the research should be obtained as soon as
possible from the individual or a legally authorized
surrogate. 00
In addition, research without consent may be justifiable under
the principles set forth in the Belmont Report. While circumventing
the principle of respect for persons, research without consent may be
consistent with the principles of beneficence and justice. Under the
principle of beneficence, research may be justified by benefits that
flow from developing more effective treatments for emergency
medical conditions. There is also the prospect of direct benefit for the
subjects, but the difficulty is in determining whether the risks
outweigh the benefits. 301 Justification under the principle of justice is
more problematic. While arguably emergency research conducted in
trauma centers may have more impact on economically and
299.
300.
301.

See generally A CATHOLIC GUIDE TO ETHICAL CLINICAL RESEARCH 6 (2008).
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educationally disadvantaged populations, it may also provide those
populations with access to more effective treatment. 3 02
In the research context, Catholic teaching seems more in
accord with the absolutist position of the Nuremberg Code than with
the approach taken by Fost, discussed supra. As Beecher noted in his
landmark article, "[A]ccording to Pope Pius XI . . . science is not the
highest value to which all other orders of values . . . should be

subordinated."3 03 Similarly, the guidelines for clinical research
adopted by the Catholic Medical Association and the National
Catholic Bioethics Center (the Catholic Guidelines) note: "The
subject and not a procedure, process, or product being studied is the
most important aspect of every clinical trial."304
The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides:
"Experimentation on human beings does not conform to the dignity
of the person if it takes place without the informed consent of the
subject or those who legitimately speak for him." 30 Thus under the
Catechism, "experimentation that takes place without the subject's
informed consent is per se a violation of human dignity." 0 6 The
Catholic Guidelines developed by the National Catholic Bioethics
Center and the Catholic Medical Association state: "Potential
subjects who do not understand the nature of the study, or who
otherwise lack capacity, cannot provide informed consent." 3 07
In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II repeatedly and
forcefully teaches the value and dignity of human life and the need to
be vigilant in protecting life, particularly when it is most
vulnerable. 08 The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services clearly articulates the importance of protecting
vulnerable
patients.30
The Catholic
Guidelines provide,
"[i]ndividuals who are vulnerable by virtue of. . .medical or
psychological condition, or cognitive status must be particularly
protected by all physicians and medical researchers."310 Unconscious
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Beecher, supra note 87, at 1354.

304.

A CATHOLIC GUIDE TO ETHICAL CLINICAL RESEARCH 9 (2008).

305. CATECHISM
OF
THE
CATHOLIC
CHURCH,
1 2295,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENGO0 15/1 NDEX.HTM.
306. Garnett, supra note 65, at 503, n. 258.
307. CATHOLIC GUIDE, supra note 304, at 7.
308. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (Mar. 25, 1995), n. 44.
309.

at

ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES [ERDs],

Dirs. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 31 (5th Ed. 2009).
310.

available

CATHOLIC GUIDE, supra note 304, at 8.

2011]

EMERGENCY RESEARCH WAIVER OF CONSENT RULE

203

persons are considered to be particularly vulnerable under the
Catholic Guidelines, and while they may be included in clinical
research that provides direct benefits, "great care must be exercised
to protect their well-being and enhance their safety." 3 1 Moreover,
"disadvantaged subjects should never be enrolled in clinical trials
from which they cannot benefit at least indirectly."3 12 Individuals who
are experiencing life-threatening medical conditions or sudden
deterioration of physiologic function due to illness or injury are
particularly vulnerable. This is the exact target population of the
ERWC rule; thus it could be argued that enrolling such patients in a
study without their consent based on the mere fact of geography
(illness or injury occurring in a particular research community)
violates the basic ethical norm of respect for the human person. The
Catholic Guidelines also require that "research. . .be conducted
according to accepted scientific principles." It must be "necessary
and potentially useful.""' It is not acceptable to enroll subject in trials
that have "unnecessary or disproportionate risks which overshadow
the expected benefit."31 4 Thus, it is particularly important to protect
patients in trials where they are deprived of a standard treatment.
Waiving informed consent also undermines the altruistic
motive for participation in research by depriving subjects of an
opportunity to agree to participate in a research protocol that may not
confer any direct benefit on them in order to benefit the community.
In arguing that physicians ought to ask their patients to participate in
therapeutic experiments, Dr. Edmund Pellegrino notes that, "not to
ask is to deprive the subject of an opportunity for altruism that she
may cherish.""' A subject who consents to participate in a medical
research study involving risks to health may be willing to do that in
order to benefit society or others. In light of the voluntary nature of
the undertaking, the subject participating in the research may derive a
psychological benefit, but there is no such benefit to the patient that
is enrolled in a study without his or her actual consent.
Moreover, the acceptance of waiver of consent in emergency
research could lead to attempts to adopt norms favoring waiver of
consent in other contexts. For example, although the concept of
311.
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presumed consent for the removal of organs after death for
transplantation is not new, 1 6 there has been a revival of this idea and
a push to move toward legislation mandating that unless otherwise
indicated, all individuals would be presumed to have given
permission for removal of organs after death for transplantation."
This is in direct violation of the moral norms set forth by the Catholic
Church"'" and the teaching of Pope John Paul II.319 Current proposed
legislation in the State of New York indicates how far along this path
we have begun to travel.32 0
The reliance on community consultation as a justification for
waiving consent is troubling from a Catholic perspective insofar as it
makes the will of this nebulous community binding on all members
of the community. This sets the preferences of the community as the
moral standard, and gives the power to authorize research on
individuals to an anonymous group rather than one's loved ones or
chosen surrogates. It can readily be seen that approval by such
communities could be utilized to justify other types of actions, both
medical and non-medical, which would negate or undermine the
basic rights of the individual. For example, Donum Vitae specifically
speaks about such coercive force of the community in addressing the
issue of use of human embryos or fetuses for experimentation.32'

VI.

CONCLUSION

The ERWC rule violates the first principle of the Nuremberg
Code by permitting researchers to enroll subjects into trials without
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are in conformity with the moral law if the physical and psychological dangers and risks to the
donor are proportionate to the good sought for the recipient. Organ donation after death is a noble
and meritorious act and is to be encouraged as an expression of generous solidarity. It is not
morally acceptable if the donor or his proxy has not given explicit consent.").
319. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Eighteenth International Congress of Transplant
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Surgery, Aug. 29, 2000,
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their consent or the consent of a proxy. Also, Catholic teaching
appears to be consistent with the Nuremberg Code. The ERWC rule
may also conflict with Catholic teaching because community
consultation is not an acceptable substitute for informed consent, and
may not provide adequate protections for patients. Accordingly, we
believe that IRBs affiliated with Catholic institutions should carefully
scrutinize trials proposed under the ERWC rule. These trials are
particularly troubling where they involve the denial of standard
treatment to some subjects.

